Alan Page Fiske has made a strong empirical case that social cognition is structured by four elementary mental schemata, the "relational models". Fiske argues that the four models are innate, and he thus concludes that they are encoded in the genome. But work on self-organization suggests that biological structures can be innate without being genetically encoded. Plausibly, the four models result from principles of self-organization, specifically a sequence of symmetry-breaking bifurcations. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the four models can be arranged in a sequence from more-to-less symmetrical, exemplifying a chain of descending subgroups. This formal property is commonly observed in self-organizing systems. Furthermore, the less symmetrical the model, the later it first appears in childhood. This is analogous to embryonic development in which the organism begins in a highly symmetrical state and develops into a less symmetrical one, plausibly due to a sequence of symmetry breakings. It is also analogous to the acquisition of syntax, in which it has been argued that the initial state of the language faculty is highly symmetrical and hence relatively simple, with syntactic complexity partly deriving from a sequence of symmetry breakings plus interactions with other mental faculties. Explaining complexity in terms of symmetry breaking and interaction with other mental faculties can also plausibly be applied to social cognition, suggesting a parallel with minimalism in syntactic theory.
There has been a recent attempt to explain syntactic processing in cognition in terms of self-organization (Jenkins, 2000) . This suggests, at least tentatively, a program with the ultimate goal of embedding a branch of cognitive science, namely linguistics, into brain physics. But there is no reason to stop with linguistics. There is also evidence that central features of social cognition result from self-organization. The article is an attempt to show that it is at least reasonable, as a research program, to try to embed the science of social cognition into brain physics, perhaps through computer modelling of coupled nonlinear neural oscillators conjectured to enter directly into social cognition.
The paper reviews evidence supporting the view that there are four elementary mental models informing human social conceptions, expectations, and value judgments (Fiske, 1991 (Fiske, , 1992 . The paper then discusses how these four models correspond to the four classic measurement scales (Stevens, 1946) thus forming a Guttman scale (Guttman, 1944) . Thus, at the core of social cognition, one finds a descending chain of subgroups, just as one finds in any system in which there is a series of symmetry breakings. This suggests that symmetry breaking plays a central role in structuring social intelligence. A research program for modelling the neural network whose activity undergoes such symmetry breakings is then proposed.
THE RELATIONAL-MODELS TYPOLOGY
Alan Page Fiske has made a strong empirical case that social cognition is structured by four elementary mental schemata, the "relational models" (1991, 1992) . According to Fiske, there are four such models which centrally enter into the construction, evaluation, and interpretation of social relations. It will later be argued that these models illustrate a sequence of broken symmetries. Descriptions of these mental schemata follow:
In Communal Sharing (CS) members of a dyad or group are treated as equivalent and undifferentiated. When implemented in moral judgments, CS motivates the view that people should be generous in sharing with others in the group. All members of the group are conceived as sharing a common substance, such as blood. The needs of the group take precedence over one's own needs; but because of the commonly shared substance, this generosity is not necessarily conceived of as altruism. One identifies with the group. Examples of CS include intense romantic love, racism, nationalism, and indiscriminate killing of anyone outside of the group in retaliation for an attack on the group. In Authority Ranking (AR), people or groups of people are arranged in a linear hierarchy in which subordinates are expected to respect and obey, and superiors enjoy greater prestige while also having duties of protection and pastoral care for their inferiors. Superiors are entitled to more social benefits, and are expected to outline the norms of society. Examples include military rankings, ethnic rankings, ancestor worship, and monotheism. Equality Matching (EM) relationships involve an even balance or one-to-one correspondence. They involve knowledge of what would be required to restore such balance if it is lost. Examples include rules which involve turn taking, equal time, and equal team size in competitive sports; also restitution in kind, namely eye-for-an-eye justice, and uniform contributions. Market Pricing (MP) relationships are structured by ratios or rates such as prices, wages, interest, rents, tithes, or cost-benefit analyses. The free market is such an obvious implementation of MP that there is a danger of overlooking other forms of MP, those which do not involve competition, money, individualism, or selfinterest. Note, for example, that the utilitarian maxim "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is also structured by MP. The core concept in MP is proportionality, e.g. giving someone his due as determined by a ratio scale.
In a manner almost like that of syntax in language, Fiske suggests that the vast range of human social forms results from combinations of these four models, sometimes recursively self-embedded as in one implementation of a model nested within another implementation of the same model, e.g. a hierarchical ranking of individuals who form a group which is itself hierarchically ranked in relation to other groups. Rules of implementation are also crucial, e.g. in the case of CS, one must decide what will count as "sameness of substance,": blood?, soul?, occupation of the same land?, love?. Likewise, one must establish a criterion of sameness in EM in order to determine whether or not each individual or group has been allotted the "same thing" (Fiske, 1991 (Fiske, , 1992 . And so on, for each model. Implementation rules plus combinatorial properties explain the vast number of humanly possible social forms.
Social life is highly complex and diverse. There are specific social relations and attitudes expected for many domains, e.g. work, the social significance of time, of objects, forms of reward and punishment, exchange, and so on. If one assumes that each domain is structured by its own unique rules, not governed by any common set of principles which reach across all domains, then one finds that there is a severe learning problem for the child or foreigner who is to be acculturated into a community. The severity just gets worse when one realizes that the evidence for these rules presented to children and foreigners is often "degenerate" in the sense that it is misleading or incomplete (Hauser, 2006 ). Fiske's solution is to propose that the relational models are biologically innate, each child being prepared by nature to apply some conjunction or other of them to a social situation. "By combining the elementary forms in various concatenations and nested hierarchies, people produce complex social forms" (Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991: 658) . The evidence for these specific models being innate is that they have been observed in a broad range of cultures (Fiske, 1991) , and have been shown in psychological studies to be predictive of social judgments in individuals with diverse cultural backgrounds (Fiske, 1993) .
It is crucial to bear in mind that the four models are cognitive phenomena found in the individual's brain. Fiske's relational-models framework is not social theory in the strict sense, i.e. it only indirectly accounts for societal phenomena. It is, rather, a theory of social cognition. It casts light on society and it was initially suggested by enormous amounts of anecdotal evidence from anthropology (1991), but its primary empirical traction, its testability in other words, comes mainly from studies performed on individuals.
For the sake of showing that this is indeed an empirically well established approach, let's consider various studies revealing the fundamental psychological importance of the four models. One study concerned accidentally referring to someone by the wrong name, the assumption being that such errors reflect the cognitive framework used in organizing social relations . The aim was to test whether the relational models would predict such errors better than other categorizations, such as age, personality, and ethnicity. The prediction, more specifically, was that if one says "Bob" when one meant to say "Jeff," it is likely that one stands in the same sort of social relation to Bob as one does to Jeff as defined by the relational models framework. Jeff and Bob being, say, of the same age was predicted to be a less reliable indicator. With the exception of gender, the relational models were shown to be the most reliable predictor of such errors.
Fiske and his colleagues also investigated mistakes involving person memory in which one incorrectly remembers with whom one performed an activity, as well as misdirected actions in which an action is directed at someone other than whom one intended to direct the action Fiske, 1993) . Some of these studies were also replicated in non-Western cultures, namely among Koreans, Liberians, Bengalis, and Chinese (Fiske, 1993) . Once again, with the exception of gender, the relational models were the best predictor of such errors. The models were also found to be the best predictor of deliberate social substitutions, e.g. deciding to perform an activity with person B instead of person A (Fiske & Haslam, 1997) . Furthermore, when subjects are asked to recall with which individuals they performed social activities, they tend to recall those individuals in runs clustering according to the models (Fiske, 1995) .
Nick Haslam and Fiske performed another study testing the relational-models thesis against other hypotheses for how people cognize social relations (1992) . Subjects listed at least 40 people, by name or by description, with whom they had had any sort of social relationship at any time in their lives. Two lists of 20 were created by random selection from this list. For one such list, subjects assigned a number to each pair of names (descriptions) indicating the degree of similarity in interpersonal relationship to the subject. For example, a subject feeling that s/he has a very similar relationship with both parents would place a high number next to the pair of his or her parents' names. For the other list, subjects were asked to sort names into groups according to similarity of relationship. Each subject was asked to sort names into groups of six, and then into groups of four, and finally into just two groups. A week later, subjects were informed of the relational models typology, and then asked to sort all 40 names according to those four categories. The results from the second session were used to predict how well the various theoretical classifications predict subjects' classifications in the first session. The relational models were found to be a better predictor than other sociological and psychological hypotheses.
When one turns to the formal properties of the four relational models, one finds some remarkable characteristics which may help us understand why social cognition takes these forms. Each model exhibits certain symmetries, with some models being more symmetrical than others. For any model, there are transformations which would not make a social difference, these being symmetries. There are also transformations which would make a social difference; these are asymmetries. "Formal statements of the structures of the four models will help us to formulate explicitly the social dimensions people take account of and those they ignore; that is, what empirical differences make a social difference in each kind of social relationship" (Fiske, 1991: 207) . More specifically, a symmetry is a permutation which would make no difference to the output of the social faculty, the social faculty being those neural mechanisms which most directly enter into mental computations utilizing the relational models. Other permutations cause the social faculty to give a different output than it would have otherwise, these being asymmetries. What counts as a symmetrical permutation for one model might be an asymmetrical permutation for another. "Consider making all sergeants into generals and all generals into sergeants: the Authority Ranking relationships among the people would be transformed. Such one-to-one mappings of groups distort AR relations but not CS relations" (Fiske, 1991: 208) . This is because in CS all members within the group are equivalent.
There are different a/symmetries for each model, because each model takes the form of one of the four classic measurement scales (Fiske, 1991 (Fiske, , 1992 , and the measurement scales themselves exhibit different degrees of symmetry. CS corresponds to a nominal scale, AR to an ordinal scale, EM to an interval scale, and MP to a ratio scale. Each scale exhibits a set of symmetries, i.e. a group. When applied to the same object(s) of measurement, the group for the nominal scale contains the group for the ordinal scale which, in turn, contains the group for the interval scale, which contains the group for the ratio scale. In other words, the scales form a descending chain of subgroups (Stevens, 1946) . More specifically, they form a Guttman scale (Guttman, 1944) . Consider the nominal scale. As used in measurement, the nominal scale only distinguishes things in a category from things that are not in it. For example, the question "Are you a smoker, yes or no?," as appearing on a questionnaire, elicits information suitable for a nominal scale. Turning to the social realization of this scale, namely communal sharing (CS), one finds that the identity of any one member of the group is socially equivalent to that of any other member. All that matters socially is whether one is in the social group or outside of it. In the ordinal scale, whose social realization is authority ranking (AR), not everyone within the group is equivalent, but there are still many symmetries relatively speaking. The King must receive a longer trumpet fanfare than the Prince, but it doesn't matter precisely how much longer. That degree of freedom for variation is a symmetry. In other words, the transition from CS to AR marks a reduction, but not a total loss, of symmetry. EM marks a further reduction of symmetry. Consider granting political candidates equal air time to voice their views, as an example. Everyone must have precisely the same amount of air time, according to EM. This is less symmetrical than AR, because, as you will recall, it only matters that the King's fanfare is longer. It doesn't matter how many seconds longer it is. But there are still symmetries in EM. For example, it doesn't matter how many minutes of air time Candidate Kane is given to speak his mind, just so long as it is equal to the time given to each other candidate. MP is even less symmetrical. If one is trying to maximize widget production in one's factory, it doesn't matter that each worker is producing the same number of widgets per unit of time. What matters, rather, is that each worker is producing the largest number of widgets possible. This is because the ratio scale, which structures MP, is even less symmetrical than the interval scale, which structures EM. But note that even the ratio scale, and hence MP, exhibits symmetries. As inflation raises prices, for example, the relative prices of commodities remain the same. Fiske notes that the less symmetrical the model the later it first manifests itself in childhood. Communal sharing is the first to manifest itself, appearing in infancy. Authority ranking appears in judgment by the age of three. Equality matching first evidences itself soon after the fourth birthday, and market pricing after the eighth (Fiske, 1991 (Fiske, : 48-9, 1992 .
This descending chain of subgroups is a striking mathematical pattern in social cognition, something which looks beautiful rather than tinkered. It raises the same questions as raised by regular stripes, spots, and dappled patterns on animals. Alan Turing once asked if there are physical equations which explain these patterns (1952) . One should ask a similar question with regard to the mathematical properties of social cognition.
An appealingly simple explanation of the patterns on an animal, say the stripes of the zebra, is that they are genetically specified: DNA subsequences indicate the proteins for making a zebra and, of course, its parts including the stripes. But it can't be that simple. It is not enough for there simply to be a list of instructions for building a zebra. The laws of physics and chemistry must enter in in explaining how specific proteins form, i.e. how the protein folds, and how each protein gets to its right location. The more one finds "beauty" in the physicist's sense, i.e. symmetry, the more one suspects that the proper explanation of morphogenesis lies on the physical/chemical level rather than the genetic level. A sequence of subgroups is a striking display of beauty, very much like the phase transitions from gas to liquid to solid, which also correspond to a sequence of descending subgroups.
Turing suggested that reactions among chemicals which then diffuse through the system, i.e. a reaction-diffusion system, could explain the emergence of certain patterns, such as the zebra's stripes (1952) . Such a class of chemical reactions was eventually found by Belousov and Zhabotinskii (references in DeSimone, Beil, & Scriven, 1973) working independently of each other, what are now known as Belousov-Zhabotinskii (BZ) reactions. Today, this is understood in terms of spontaneous symmetry breaking (Stewart & Golubitsky, 1993) , i.e. a tiny perturbation in an unstable system iterates to produce a general decrease in the symmetry of the system. In a BZ reaction, a homogeneous (i.e., highly symmetrical) concentration of chemicals spontaneously forms patterns once it becomes unstable enough for spontaneous symmetry breaking to occur. The patterns which appear in a BZ reaction are one example of self-organization (self-assemby), the emergence of complexity out of homogeneity via symmetry breaking (Kauffman, 1993: 637; Goodwin, 2001) . Shigeru Rihito Asai (1995, 1996) have shown that a BZ model can predict the stripe patterns on the fish Pomecanthus; Noboru Suzuki and his colleagues have shown that the same holds true for a relatively hairless strain of mouse which exhibits pigment waves on its skin (2003) .
Another example is the emergence of the complex structure of a snowflake (Stewart & Golubitsky, 1993) . A droplet of water, insofar as it approximates a perfect sphere, exhibits continuous symmetry. Thanks to instability in the droplet, the symmetry breaks resulting in the discrete symmetry of the snowflake. The symmetries of the snowflake are a subset, specifically a subgroup, of the symmetries of the droplet. In self-organization, one finds a sequence of such symmetry breakings, that being tantamount to a chain of descending subgroups. This is how complexity can emerge seemingly out of nothing. In reality, all the symmetries were there from the start. For example, all the symmetries of the snowflake can be found in the infinitely many symmetries of the droplet. But the observer does not notice the symmetries of the system until the number of symmetries has been reduced thanks to symmetry breaking. In this manner, nature performs a kind of magic trick, pulling the rabbit of complexity out of the hat of homogeneity. That the four relational models are social applications of the four measurement scales, and that these four scales correspond to a descending chain of subgroups, is at least soft evidence for self-organization playing a role in the neural activity which underlies social cognition.
The emergence of increasingly asymmetrical relational models in the maturation of social cognition looks very much like self-organization. But self-organization of what? A relational model is not a pattern of stripes on skin. But it is plausibly a pattern of brain activity, a neural firing pattern. One evidently does find symmetry breaking and selforganization among neural firing patterns. A neuron is an oscillator, and neural oscillations, due to entrainment, exhibit patterns which can exhibit symmetry breaking and symmetry restoration. In other words, temporal symmetries of network oscillations exhibit self-organization. A classic illustration of this is found in the oscillation patterns in spinal neural networks which coordinate quadrupedal gaits (Collins & Stewart, 1993; Golubitsky, Stewart, Buono, & Collins, 1998) thus explaining why the temporal patterns of the various gaits can be arranged into a sequence of descending subgroups (Hildebrand, 1965) just as one finds in the four measurement scales (Stevens, 1946) and hence also the relational models. This suggests a research program: Try to model coupled nonlinear oscillators which, through symmetry breaking bifurcations, exhibit the same mathematical properties as found in the four measurement scales, just as was done for quadrupedal gaits. Success here would raise the question of whether such a network exists as a cognitive pattern generator in the brain, the next step in the research project being to hunt it down amongst the neural wetware. Essentially, this would be to imitate the research strategy that led to plausible computer models of the activity of the spinal central pattern generators which account for the mathematical properties of quadrupedal gaits.
I would like to dwell on these points in more detail.
There is a general classification of the activity patterns of coupled oscillators resulting from Hopf bifurcation. This has been used in gait analysis. Entrainment of neurons results in patterns of neural activation. Patterns of activation result in a pattern of footfalls, a gait (Golubitsky et al., 1998) . Such a network of neurons is known as a central pattern generator (CPG). CPGs are hypothesized to set up the basic rhythms of locomotion. Although not fully established, there is strong evidence for their existence. In fact, scientists have even pinned down the location of the CPG for gaits to the spinal cord. Early work suggested that a cat's spinal cord controls limb movement, even when the brain is removed (Brown, 1911) . A cat without a brain can even adapt its limb motion so that different limbs move in a stable pattern when they are forced to move at different speeds by a specially designed treadmill, thus showing that a high degree of inter-limb coordination is orchestrated by the spinal cord even in the absence of the rest of the CNS (Yanagihara, Udo, Kondo, & Yoshida, 1993) .
The rhythm of firing in a neural network is a temporal symmetry. Through Hopf bifurcation, the firing can change from a relatively more symmetrical to a less symmetrical pattern. More generally, an increase in the frequency of the input signal can result in a spontaneous breaking of temporal symmetry. This corresponds to the fact that, for a given species, the faster the gait the less symmetrical it is. Being due to spontaneous symmetry breaking, the resulting oscillatory pattern need not be the same as the temporal symmetries of the input firings (Golubitsky & Stewart, 1985) . A number of distinct gaits can be modeled in a single hypothetical neural network via spontaneous symmetry breakings (Golubitsky et al., 1998) . Thus one can account for a range of gaits in an animal by positing a single CPG rather than one for each gait, a considerable simplification.
The first step in the research program for analyzing gaits in terms of Hopf bifurcation was to note the symmetry groups of the various gaits and how they form a descending chain of subgroups. We are at roughly the same stage with regard to social cognition. Thanks to Fiske, we can say that there is a descending chain of subgroup types at the core of social cognition, one group corresponding to each classical measurement scale. The next step would be to search for a computer model of a neural network which, through Hopf bifurcation, enters into four stable patterns of activity, each exhibiting a symmetry group collectively constituting a descending chain of subgroups homomorphic to the Guttman scale formed by the relational models.
STYLES OF EXPLANATıON: GENETıC AND DYNAMıCıST
Whatever the ultimate explanation of the innate componenents of social cognition turns out to be, it will combine Darwinian and dynamicist approaches. Either approach alone would be insufficient for a full explanation.
When we recognize that the same ripple patterns that can exist in sand dunes also exist in biological patterns, some of us feel a profound sense of connection between the physical processes and the biological ones. However, it is undeniable that biological self-organized systems have a capacity that nonbiological self-organized systems usually do not have. Inheritance produces temporal contuity that causes a sort of memory in the system. ... Biological self-organized systems should be interesting to those who study self-organization because the inheritance that is intrinsic to biological systems gives them a level of complexity that is unique. (Cole, 2002: 256-57) The best explanation of innate biological structure, including innate mental structures such as the four relational models, will appeal both to inheritance (i.e., adaptation to an environment as encoded in the genome) as well as principles of dynamics. A purely Darwinian approach appealing to inheritance, and a purely dynamicist approach, such as would have been attempted by many atheist and free-thinking scientists and philosophers before Darwin, are both inadequate when taken alone.
To see the difference between the two approaches, and how both fall short of reality, imagine a vehicle (corresponding to a developing organism) driving through a landscape (representing all the possible forms that the organism might take, with valleys corresponding to common forms and peaks to highly unlikely ones). In models like Turing's, once you have set the vehicle rolling, it has to follow the contours of the landscape. It can't suddenly decide to change direction and head uphill if the 'natural' dynamic is to go straight on. But in the conventional view of the role of DNA, any destination is possible, given the right instructions, and no particular destination is preferred.
The true picture, however, must combine genetic 'switching' instructions and free-running mechano-chemical dynamics. An organism cannot take up any form at all: its morphology is constrained by its dynamics-the laws of physics and chemistry-as well as by its DNA instructions. But where several different lines of development are consistent with the dynamical laws, the DNA instructions can make arbitrary choices between them. (Cohen & Stewart, 1993) The appeal to physical equations to explain the mathematical forms of the four models would stand in stark contrast to Fiske's own suggestion: "My hypothesis is that, in the empty generic form ... the four basic models are represented in the human genome" (1991: 199) . He then proceeds to draw a comparison with Noam Chomsky's universal grammar. But if the four classic models are the result of broken symmetries, obeying physical equations, starting from the maximally symmetrical CS model, then only CS is truly parallel with universal grammar. Chomsky notes three factors which enter into the growth of the language faculty: genetic endowment, experience, and "Principles not specific to the faculty of language" (2005: 6). The term "universal grammar" refers to genetic endowment only. Principles not specific to the faculty of language include principles of physics such as symmetry and energy minimization (Jenkins, 2000) . Consistent with this interpretation of Chomsky, he remarks that "universal grammar is the theory of the initial state of the language faculty" (2000: 72).
The linguist Lyle Jenkins speculates that the language faculty develops from this initial state partly due to a series of broken symmetries (2000: 162f). More specifically, Jenkins discusses the development of restricted word order from an initial state in which word order is wholly free. Following work of Ian Stewart (1998), Jenkins observes that a permutation of elements in a string of symbols which leaves semantics unchanged is a symmetry of codes. For example, if there were a variant of Morse code in which any string composed wholly of dots were read as C, any string composed wholly of dashes were read as A, and any mixed string as T, this code would have certain symmetries not found in the current code. There would be many more possible transformations that would make no difference to the information conveyed, as compared with standard Morse code. Hence, a natural language with relatively free word order, such as Sanskrit, enjoys certain symmetries not possessed by a language with more restricted word order, such as Mandarin. Jenkins uses this fact to put some flesh on the idea that the initial state of the language faculty grows into a mature language partly due to principles of selforganization, including symmetry breaking. In the initial state, word order could be more highly symmetrical than what one commonly finds in a mature natural language, with the final state resulting from a series of broken symmetries.
Notice that in Jenkins' speculation, we have the emergence of complexity out of relative homogeneity via a sequence of broken symmetries, a phenomenon which is strikingly similar to the growth of the embryo from a highly symmetrical sphere to a fetus exhibiting far fewer symmetries. One disanalogy, however, would be the ability of a multilingual person to switch between languages with different degrees of grammatical symmetry. The fetus, by contrast, represents a frozen state of relative asymmetry with no going back to its earlier zygotic state. If Jenkins' speculation is even roughly on track, then language may be more similar to animal gaits, in which a single animal can modulate between gaits exhibiting various degrees of symmetry (Hildebrand, 1965) . This ability to modulate between different degrees of symmetry is also reflected in human social cognition in which one can shift between the four relational models in conceptualizing various social situations.
A possible role for self-organization in the growth of the language faculty illustrates the fact that a feature of language can be innate (i.e., not learned) without being encoded in the genome. Fiske does not have to say that, simply because the four relational models are innate, they must be "represented in the genome." In fact, given its highly symmetrical nature, even CS may not be fully represented in the genome. What is actually encoded genetically may be an extremely fundamental feature of CS, the rest of social cognition being the result of physics and interactions with other mental faculties. Perhaps the only element of CS represented in the genome is sympathy or love, essentially the view anticipated by Darwin in his chapter on the moral sense in Descent of Man.
According to the research program suggested here, an innate tendency toward love or sympathy can be given a Darwinian explanation. Plausibly, as Darwin himself suggested, this tendency is necessary for the mother/infant bond, at least in mammals, which probabilizes the survival of one's hereditary information into future generations. But sympathy as such is a very simple thing, and social cognition as found in the adult has grown to be quite complex. How does this come about? Self-organization can explain part of it. One can think of the matter a bit metaphorically as the raw material of sympathy being poured into the molds of the four measurement scales.
But the four relational models, as they function in social judgment, are more than just sympathy combined with formal properties. Fiske provides a long list of socially significant domains each conceptualized by each model in some characteristic way (1992: 694-96). These domains include work, orientation to land, decision making, social influence, motivation, and moral judgment. Take time as one illustration. In communal sharing "Relationships are idealized as eternal (e.g., solidarity that is based on descent or common origin)." In authority ranking "Sequential precedence marks status by serial ordering of action or attention according to rank." Regarding equality matching, "Oscillation of turns, of hosting, or other reciprocation at appropriate frequency" structures one's sense of time. The attitude toward time in market pricing involves "Calculus of rates of interest, return, pay, or productivity per unit of time" (1992: 695). This degree of semantic richness must depend upon interaction with a broad range of mental faculties. These interaction effects add to the complexity of social cognition.
On the research program suggested here, the social faculty can be tentatively broken down into three elements: a core of sympathy having a Darwinian explanation, the four models considered abstractly and generically as structured self-organizations of sympathy, and rich semantic properties resulting from interactions of the self-organized core of social cognition with other mental faculties. Experience enters in on the level of interaction, since these other mental faculties potentially include perceptual mechanisms.
SIMILARITIES WITH MINIMALISM IN SYNTACTIC THEORY
The above division of the social faculty into three constituents bears a striking resemblance to recent developments in the study of syntax. In both cases, a very simple element is posited, an element which is taken to be the core of the faculty in question. More complex features of that element are explained in terms of principles of selforganization plus interactions with other mental faculties including perceptual mechanisms. Specifically, one finds similarities between the research program suggested above and Chomsky's minimalist program. Some discussion of language is in order to flesh out the comparison.
Let's begin with what Chomsky takes to be the computational core of language. In natural language, we find what Wilhelm von Humboldt called "the infinite use of finite means" (quoted in Chomsky, 2000: 6) . You can't pin a number on how many sentences there are. In fact, we are not aware of any way to do so even in principle. That means that the number must be a very special one, either zero or infinity. It isn't zero, so it must be infinity. How can there be potentially infinitely many sentences? After all, the basic materials for language are finite. Presumably everything that one uses to produce a sentence is coded in one's brain, and the brain has only finite storage. In the case of the birds and the bees, the potential infinity of signals is due to their using continua. For example, the length of the line traced by the waggling honeybee corresponds to the distance of the nectar. But humans don't use continua, at least not in producing sentences. We use discrete items, words 1 , to produce them. Turing showed how recursion can be used to generate a potentially infinite number of outputs from a finite number of symbols and rules for combining them. In other words, even though Turing is not usually categorized as a linguist, he made a very big contribution to the study of natural language by showing how it can be what Humboldt said it is, namely "the infinite use of finite means." The "secret" is recursion plus a rule for stopping.
[Recursive procedures] are very important because they make it possible for a sequence of operations to be repeated over and over again until some condition is fulfilled, but in doing so to obey, not fresh instructions on each repetition, but the same ones over and over again. To take a domestic analogy. Suppose Mother wants Tommy to call at the cobbler's every morning on his way to school to see if her shoes are done, she can ask him afresh every morning. Alternatively she can stick up a notice once and for all in the hall which he will see when he leaves for school and which tells him to call for the shoes, and also to destroy the notice when he comes back if he has the shoes with him. (Turing, 1950: 438; see also Boolos, Burgess, & Richard, 2002) Recursion makes it possible to keep using the same old rules to get brand new results. Chomsky posits the simplest possible recursively combinatorial operation, "Merge," to explain the potential infinity of natural language (Chomsky, 1995 (Chomsky, , 2000 (Chomsky, , 2005 Uriagereka, 1997; Hornstein, 2001) . Merge makes it possible to embed an object within an object of the same type. Notice that refuse to plead for mercy is a verb phrase which embeds another verb phrase, namely plead for mercy. In other words, Merge allows the mapping of a verb phrase onto another verb phrase. This is just another way of saying that the rule for making a verb phrase can be applied to its own result, which means that it is recursive. By applying the rule for generating a verb phrase to its result, one can produce a novel verb phrase. And the process is potentially endless. The resulting verb phrase can, in turn, be mapped onto yet another verb phrase, and so on ad infinitum, at least potentially. Old rules, old building blocks, but new results and no end in sight.
For Chomsky, Merge is the core of language, and the first appearance of Merge was the pivotal step in language evolution (Chomsky, 2005) . It is analogous to the role of sympathy in social cognition, assuming that the earlier discussion of the relational models was even roughly correct. One interesting potential difference, however, is that Merge is computational. But it is not so obvious that sympathy, when considered in isolation, is a recursive procedure. The relevant analogy is not that both are inherently computational, but that both are very simple intrinsically while accruing complexity through selforganization and interaction.
Recursion does evidently enter into social cognition, for social judgments also exhibit the potentially infinite use of finite means: There is no principled limit on the number and range of social judgments, including moral judgments. That moral judgment in particular exhibits the infinite use of finite means was noted by David Hume, who observed that 'tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular instance, these [moral] sentiments are produc'd by an original quality and primary constitution. For as the number of our duties is, in a manner, infinite, tis impossible that our original instincts should extend to each of them, and from our very first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of precepts, which are contain'd in the compleatest system of ethics. Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual maxims, by which nature is conducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe, and every thing is carry'd on in the easiest and most simple manner. 'Tis necessary, therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded 2 .
The social faculty may be utilizing the recursive component of language in achieving these effects, an illustration of how sympathy acquires complexity, thus forming a social faculty, through interacting with other faculties. Sympathy alone cannot account for the unbounded variety of social judgment, but the social faculty's partnership with Merge could acount for it. Merge all by itself could hardly explain the vast range of syntactic properties found in natural language. But Chomsky's project also involves two other elements, namely principles of physics and interfaces with other faculties. There is evidence for economy conditions in syntax. These economy conditions are principles constraining syntactic movement, e.g. the movement of what in the mental transformation of Sam said what into what Sam said. To speak of economy conditions is to say that movement is always of the smallest object possible over the shortest distance possible, and movement occurs in the fewest possible cases. To put the matter metaphorically, there is a kind of "laziness" in syntax, what Chomsky refers to as "least effort" (Chomsky, 1995; Uriagereka, 1997) . Chomsky notes that economy conditions resemble principles of least action and energy minimization in physics, and speculates that here in syntax we are seeing hints of brain physics, i.e. evidence of self-organization (Chomsky, 1999; Jenkins, 2000) . Only the first what is pronounced, but both are semantically interpreted, the first as an operator and the second as a variable: the thing x such that Sam said x (Hornstein, 2001) . This is what is referred to, rather loosely, as the "movement" of what. It illustrates that movement is a subcase of Merge. Hence, to say that physical principles of least action constrain the form that movement takes is to say that they constrain Merge. That physical principles of least action explain the economy conditions placed upon Merge is analogous to the observation that a sequence of symmetry breakings results in human sympathy acquiring the four forms of the measurement scales. In both cases, an inherently simple feature acquires greater complexity through self-organization. The analogy grows stronger if one accepts Jenkins' proposal that a series of broken symmetries places further constraints upon Merge, specifically those involving word order.
It is a further goal of the minimalist program to explain any remaining syntactic phenomena in terms of interactions with other mental faculties, those being, again on minimalist assumptions, semantics phonetics and the lexicon alone. Hence, minimalists speak of "legibility conditions," i.e. each faculty which interfaces with Merge requires that syntactic representations be of a certain form in order to be processed (Chomsky, 1995) . In the minimalist literature, the discussion of these legibility conditions has grown to be quite specific. The same is true for discussions of the lexicon. There is nothing analogous to that in the study of the relational models typology. One can only observe that the semantic richness of the models and their implementation in behavior must involve interaction with a broad range of mental faculties in some fashion or other. Furthermore, linguists are able to narrow the range of interaction to three other faculties, while social cognitive scientists have to deal with an indefinitely large range of potential interactors. These two facts mean that there is greater potential for idealization in linguistics than there is in social cognition, at least with regard to the relational models typology. Since idealization is crucial in devising theory, this is some reason to hold out greater hope of arriving at theoretical understanding in syntax than in social cognition.
However, there is one respect in which the science of social cognition may have an edge over syntactic minimalism. Chomsky's discussion of economy conditions has been harshly criticized as being too metaphorical for science. To take an example that should be familiar from the above discussion, it is metaphorical to speak of syntactic movement as being "lazy." "This metaphorical and anthropomorphic talk … is supposed to be theoretical progress in the characterization of human language. Indeed, it is supposed to be neuroscience … What it seems to me to represent is a complete collapse in standards of scientific talk about natural language syntax" (Pullum, 1996: 142) . By contrast, there is nothing metaphorical in the observation that each relational model takes the form of a measurement scale, that each measurement scale has a corresponding symmetry group, and that these groups form a chain of descending subgroups such as one finds in physical symmetry breaking. Furthermore, Jenkins' appeal to symmetry breaking in syntax is far less specific than the sequence of types of groups found in social cognition as reflected in the measurement scales. For example, one can say that EM takes the form of ordered Abelian groups, because that is the group of symmetries exhibited by the interval scale (Fiske, 1991: 211) . Jenkins' discussion of symmetry breaking in syntax, by contrast, contains nothing so specific. For these two reasons, the potential link to physics in the science of social cognition may be a bit more solid than current attempts to link syntax with physics, at least at this point in the progress of research.
Nonetheless, similarities between syntactic minimalism and the attempt to understand the development of social cognition in terms of self-organization are quite striking. This may indicate the general usefulness of the strategy outlined by Cohen and Stewart above (1993) , namely seeking to explain biological phenomena by searching for the right balance between dynamics and genetically encoded adaptations. That strategy encourages the distinction of various "design factors" as found here and in Chomsky's approach (2005) . In both cases, three design factors can be distinguished: the genetic component, principles of physics, and experience.
CLARIFICATIONS
Judging from referees' responses to an early draft of this paper, there are several possible misunderstandings which one must be careful to avoid. I would like to quote from one referee at length, since I believe the referee has stated very clearly a tempting misinterpretation of what I am trying to do:
The author proposes a potential link between the mathematical behaviour of brain activity and social behaviour. However, until the precise details of that connection are worked out, there would seem to be little explanatory force in the argument. Clearly, the flow of current in a computer is linked to the display of particular words and pictures on screen, but until you have the intermediate theories of transistors, logic gates, computation, software, etc, you do not have a causal theory with explanatory force. As a "direction for future study", there can be no criticism. However, as it currently stands, the paper seems to make no new claims as to particular testable predictions, nor does it discuss any rival approaches. Clearly, social behaviour is related to individual brain states, but the observation of mathematical similarities requires not just correlation, but also a chain of causality, if the theory is to have explanatory and predictive force.
This interpretation of the current project is mistaken on several levels. This may be my fault, so I will try to state more explicitly what the current project is meant to be.
For starters, the thing-to-be-explained (the "explanandum") is not behavioral. If it were behavioral, there would be little cause for optimism. Rather, the paper attempts to isolate a relatively simple explanandum for study. The more factors are at work, the less likely one is to arrive at a deep understanding. The first step toward arriving at such understanding is to screen out interfering factors, this being the point behind building laboratories. And even so, there is still no guarantee of success. Given that the human brain is the most complex object known in the universe, to attempt to explain the behavior of humans in groups is likely far too ambitious a goal. Explaining the behavior of a single individual is one level of idealization. A greater level would be to explain the behavior of the brain. An even greater level would be to explain the behavior of one mental faculty. A still greater level of idealization would be to attempt to explain the formal properties of the activity of one mental faculty. That is the level of idealization for this paper: to explain the formal properties of the models which lie at the core of social intelligence. This is a far more modest, and hence more realistic, goal than trying to explain group behavior.
It is recognized in linguistics, for example, that even to attempt to understand the interaction of several mental faculties is a huge undertaking, certainly not a first step. The deepest theoretical understanding in linguistics is largely in syntax where one has some degree of mathematical rigor. Success in devising empirically adequate theories of syntax gives one some insight into the properties of the faculties which interact with syntax, but even this is just a matter of inching through the darkness. For example, the properties of the semantic system and sensorimotor system, which interface with syntax, are only very imperfectly known (Chomsky, 1999: 29f) . Likewise, Stewart and his colleagues have made little progress to date in explaining how the central pattern generator for gaits interfaces with systems leading to the limbs. Nor have they explained what system interfacing with the CPG triggers a breaking of symmetry in the CPG. To demand that their account contain such information at this early date would be unreasonable. It is a very different matter with computers and robots, of course, because they are built by humans. If you want to know what interfaces with what and how, you just ask the engineer who designed the machine. But understanding cognition in an animal is a slow exploratory process conducted in small steps.
I agree with the comment that no testable hypothesis has been proposed here, but that misses the point. No hypothesis has been proposed at all, testable or otherwise. The point is to propose a research program for generating testable hypotheses along the lines of the computer modeling that has been used in gait analysis. The program itself is to be judged according to whether it flourishes or degenerates when seriously pursued (Lakatos, 1970) . The program is to attempt to model a neural network which, through spontaneous symmetry breaking, exhibits four patterns of activity with the formal properties of the four measurement scales or something homomorphic to that. More specifically, the four models have different formal properties: Communal sharing is an equivalence relation, authority ranking is a linear ordering, equality matching is an Abelian group, and market pricing is an Archimedean ordered field (Fiske, 1991: 210f) . If a network can be modeled which, merely through change in frequency of its input pulses, exhibits four patterns of activity which are homomorphic to the four models, then that hypothetical network itself would be a testable hypothesis, a tentative "social pattern generator" lying at the core of relational-models cognition. Its testability will ultimately depend upon investigating which areas of the brain most directly enter into relational-models cognition and discovering the structure and activity of those areas, a project which has begun. In fact, there is already tentative evidence that the same neural tissue is especially active in, at least, perceptions both of CS and AR interactions (Iacoboni et al., 2004) , an encouraging sign for the research program here suggested according to which the same neural tissue realizes all four models through symmetry breakings as opposed to there being four distinct networks, one for each model. If one such proposed neural network fails to correspond to the facts, then another model can be sought, until one either arrives at a strongly corroborated model or one abandons the research program, after many failed attempts, as a dead end.
One constraint on an acceptable model is that it must not overgenerate. It must spontaneously produce patterns corresponding to the symmetry groups of the four classic measurement scales, but to no others. Fiske notes that a fifth measurement scale is conceivable, namely the discrete interval scale (Fiske, 1991 (Fiske, , 1992 . In terms of symmetry it would be situated between the interval and ratio scales. If it were realized socially, it would correspond to a relational model intermediate in symmetry between EM and MP. But no such relational model is known to be socially realized. This lacuna should be reflected in any plausible candidate for a social pattern generator. I.e., it should not exhibit a pattern of activity corresponding to a discrete interval scale.
As for my not discussing rival interpretations of the emergence of the four relational models, I am not aware of any rival interpretations. If there were adaptationist explanations of all four models, then that would be a rival interpretation. But I am not aware of any attempt to provide adaptationist explanations for all of them. Fiske has tried to explain two of the four models in fitness-promoting terms, namely communal sharing and equality matching (1991: 195f) . He notes that CS, in some cases, promotes the replication of one's genes, e.g. when CS is implemented with regard to close relatives. By showing a concern for my offspring comparable to the concern I show for myself, I increase the probability of my offspring living to reproduce and thus raise the chances of my genes continuing to copy themselves.
Fair enough. There are cases in which CS increases fitness, and no doubt the need to replicate one's genes does explain why CS is applied in many cases. However, inclusive fitness does not explain the distribution of CS to cases as well one might hope. "It's no secret that one is likely to have more concern for one's children than nephews, and more concern for them than people one doesn't know. And it's possible to develop some evolutionary scenarios for that. The problem is that the same scenarios show that everyone cares more about children dying from AIDS in Africa than for one's pet kitten, and no one should care at all about a dolphin stranded on the beach." 3 Fiske's suggestion that perhaps equality matching can be understood in terms of reciprocal altruism is also problematic. While it is true that reciprocity can be construed as EM, it is not the case that all cases of EM can be construed as reciprocal altruism. Fiske often gives membership dues as an example of EM, but if membership dues were to be understood in terms of reciprocal altruism this wouldn't explain the logic behind each member paying the same amount. As for the other two models, Fiske argues for their innateness, but has nothing to say about them in specifically Darwinian terms. It is true that the need to maximize inclusive fitness itself superficially looks like an application of market pricing, but it would be more strictly correct to say that organisms behave as if they are motivated by a desire to maximize the replication of their genes without their literally having such thoughts even unconsciously, as Fiske acknowledges.
Furthermore, there is a mathematical regularity among the four models, namely their forming a Guttman scale, which suggests that physics explains them rather than adaptation to an ancestral environment as encoded in the genome. "Genetics can give rise to pretty much anything, whereas physics, chemistry, and dynamics produce mathematical regularities" (Stewart, 1995: 96) . Beauty is reasonably good evidence for a dynamical explanation, and there is a striking beauty at the core of social cognition, as we have seen.
In conclusion, there is reason to be optimistic at the prospect of modelling a network of coupled oscillators as a hypothesis for the structure and activity of a social pattern generator in the brain analogous to the spinal central pattern generator which evidently structures the footfall patterns in animal locomotion. The goal is to arrive at a network which, through Hopf bifurcation, can spontaneously produce four patterns of activity exhibiting a descending chain of symmetry subgroups homomorphic to the group types exhibited by the four classical measurement scales which share the formal properties of the four relational models.
